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Abstract 
This paper presents an applied microsimulation model built on household data with 
explicit treatment of heterogeneity of skills, labor preferences and opportunities, and 
consumption preferences at the individual and/or household level, while allowing for an 
endogenous determination of relative prices between sectors. The model is primarily focused on 
labor markets and labor allocation at the household level, but consumption behavior is also 
modeled. Modeling choices are driven by a desire to make the best possible use of 
microeconomic information derived from household data. This framework supports analysis of 
the impact of different growth strategies on poverty and income distribution, without making use 
of the “representative agent” assumption. The model is built on household survey data and 
represents the behavior of 4,508 households. Household behavioral equations are estimated 
econometrically. Different sets of simulation are carried out to examine the comparative statics 
of the model and study the impact of different growth strategies on poverty and inequality. 
Simulation results show the potential usefulness of this class of models to derive both poverty 
and inequality measures and transition matrices without prior assumptions regarding the intra-
group income distribution. Market clearing equations allow for the endogenous determination of 
relative prices between sectors. The impact of different growth strategies on poverty and 
inequality is complex given general equilibrium effects and the wide range of household positions 
in markets for factors and goods markets. Partial equilibrium analysis or the use of 
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The nature of the links between economic growth, poverty and income distribution is a 
question that is central to the study of economic development. A number of approaches have 
been taken to analyze these links. This debate has also contributed to raising the question of 
how to construct of suitable tools to analyze the impact of macroeconomic policies on poverty 
and income distribution. More recently, this led to the development of tools for counterfactual 
analysis to study the impact of structural adjustment policies. Among these tools, computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models are widely used because of their ability to produce 
disaggregated results at the microeconomic level, within a consistent macroeconomic framework 
(Adelman and Robinson, 1988; Dervis et al., 1982; Taylor, 1990; Bourguignon and al., 1991; 
De Janvry et al., 1991). Despite this ability, CGE models rest on the assumption of the 
representative agent, for both theoretical and practical reasons. From the theoretical point of 
view, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the model of Arrow-Debreu are warranted 
only when the excess demand of the economy has certain properties (Kirman, 1992; 
Hildenbrand, 1998). The assumption that the representative agent has a quasi-concave utility 
function ensures that these properties are met at the individual level, which, in turn, makes it 
possible to give microeconomic foundations to the model without having to solve the 
distributional problems. From a practical point of view, several reasons justify resorting to this 
assumption. On the one hand, the construction of macroeconomic models with heterogeneous 
agents presupposes the availability of representative microeconomic data at the national level, a 
construction which is often problematic given the difficulty of reconciling household survey data 
and national accounts data. In addition, the solution of numerical models of significant size, was 
until recently limited by the data-processing resources and software available. 
The study of income distribution within this framework requires, initially, identifying 
groups whose characteristics and behaviors are homogeneous. Generating the overall 
distribution from the distribution among several representative groups requires several 
assumptions, in particular on the form of the income distribution function within each group. The 
most common assumption in the applied models is that have a within group distribution of  
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income has an endogenous average (given by the model) and fixed higher moments. It is widely 
agreed that it would be far more satisfactory to endogenize the income variance within each 
group, since its contribution to the total inequality is generally significant, whatever the relevance 
of the classification considered. This consideration led to the development of microsimulation 
models. 
Microsimulation models, which were pioneered by the work of Orcutt (1957), are much 
less widely used than applied computable general equilibrium models. In the mid-1970s various 
teams of researchers developed microsimulation models on the basis of surveys. Most of them 
tackled questions related to the distributive impact of welfare programs or tax policies. Since 
then, many applications have been implemented in developed countries to evaluate the impact of 
fiscal reforms, or health care financing, or for studying issues related to demographic dynamics 
(Harding, 1993). Another path followed recently consists of models based on household 
surveys carried out at various dates built to identify and analyze the determinants of the evolution 
of inequality (Bourguignon et al., 1998; Alatas and Bourguignon, 1999). Microsimulation 
models can be complex depending on whether individual or household behavior is taken into 
account and represented. The majority of the analyses based on microsimulation models are 
conducted within a framework of partial equilibrium. General equilibrium effects have been 
incorporated simply by coupling an aggregate CGE model with a microsimulation model in a 
sequential way (Meagher, 1993), but this framework prevents taking into account the reactions 
of the agents at the micro level. To our knowledge, only Tongeren (1994) and Cogneau (1999) 
have carried out the full integration of a microsimulation model within a general equilibrium 
framework, the former to analyze the behavior of Dutch companies within a national framework, 
the latter to study the labor market in the town of Antananarivo. Building on this last model, we 
developed a microsimulation model within a general equilibrium framework for the Malagasy 
economy as a whole. This model is built on microeconomic data to explicitly represent the 
heterogeneity of qualifications, preferences and labor allocation, as well as consumption 
preferences at the microeconomic level. In addition, relative prices are determined 
endogenously through market-clearing mechanisms for goods and factors. The modeling choices  
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were made to best utilize the microeconomic information derived from the household data.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the modeling of income 
distribution. The methodology is then described. The microeconomic basis of the model is 
presented in Section 3, the general equilibrium framework is sketched in Section 4, and the 
presentation of the results of the estimates of the behavioral functions as well as the calibration 
of the model are presented in Section 5. Lastly, the results of simulations with various growth 
shock and social program scenarios are presented and analyzed in Sections 6 and 7. 
 
2. Modeling Income Distribution 
2.1. Some Results of Theoretical Models  
The seminal work in this field was produced by Kuznets. Starting from the analysis of 
the historical evolution of inequality in the development of two industrial economies (Germany 
and the United-Kingdom), Kuznets proposed a general law that structured, and still structures 
today, the debate and the field of analysis of the link between growth and inequality. This law 
can be summarized as follows: in the early stages of development, inequality increases, then 
decreases in the following stages. Many models have been developed to give theoretical 
foundations to this law. In the dual economy model of Lewis, the development process implies 
the transformation of an economy where the agricultural sector (synonymous in this context with 
traditional and rural) constitutes the main source of employment into an economy dominated by 
the industrial sector (synonymous with modern and urban). During this process, the 
displacement of labor from the traditional sector to the modern sector contributes to an increase 
in inequality (since the average wage in the modern sector is usually higher than in the traditional 
sector), until 50% of the population has migrated into the modern sector. Then, the overall 
inequality will drop, provided that inequality in the modern sector is not higher than in the 
traditional sector. A formalization of the dual economy model by Robinson (1976) made it 
possible to specify the assumptions on which the U-curve rests. These assumptions include i) 
income variance in the two sectors of economy is fixed, ii) there is no selection bias of migrating  
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households, iii) terms of trade are exogenous. 
 Econometric analysis of the Kuznets law thus far has been mainly carried out on cross 
country data (Alhuwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Deininger and Squire, 1996). These 
empirical studies have provided mixed results. In parallel, many comparative statics analyses 
starting from the dual economy model  have been done to assess the impact of growth on 
inequality (Bourguignon, 1990; Baland and Ray, 1992; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1993). The 
common mechanisms emphasized in these works are the following i) labor displacement 
between the two sectors is the main engine affecting growth and the evolution of the income 
distribution, and ii) income distribution affects equilibrium through variation of the composition of 
demand for goods between income classes. 
Through a model of a dual economy in general equilibrium, Bourguignon (1990) 
examines the effect of a "modern" growth shock on the shape of the Lorenz curve and shows 
how the nature of growth (equalizing or unequalizing) depends on the parameters of demand. 
The originality of the approach lies in the modeling of the Lorenz curve to characterize the 
income distribution among the three classes of agents represented (capitalists, workers in the 
modern sector, and workers in the traditional sector), which makes it possible to avoid the 
problem of choosing an inequality indicator, since results of various partial measurements can 
give contradictory results. Another significant contribution compared to the standard dual 
economy model, is the general equilibrium framework, which allows taking into account 
redistributive effects through the evolution of the agricultural terms of trade. The magnitude of 
these effects, and thus the equalizing or unequalizing nature of the growth shock, depends on the 
characteristics of the demand for the traditional good (agricultural), in particular on the values of 
price and income elasticities of the demand for this good. More precisely, the author shows that 
a sufficient condition for the modern growth shock to be equalizing is that the absolute value of 
the price elasticity of demand for the traditional good is less than or equal to the income 
elasticity of demand for this traditional good if the latter is less than 1, or less than or equal to 1 
if not, and that this is the case for all household groups. In the particular case where the income 
elasticity is the same regardless of income level, the comparative statics analysis shows that the  
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higher the price elasticity of demand for the traditional good for a given value of income 
elasticity, the more unequalizing the modern growth shock will be. Conversely, the higher the 
income elasticity of demand for the traditional good for a given value of price elasticity, the more 
equalizing the modern growth shock will be.  
Eswaran and Kotwal (1993) studied the impact of various development strategies on 
poverty and inequality through a two-sector model (agriculture, industry), with two factors of 
production (work and land) and two household classes (landowners and landless workers). In 
this model, the distributive mechanisms are driven by the hierarchical specification of 
preferences. The authors incorporate Engel’s law in a radical way by specifying that the demand 
for industrial good be expressed only when the demand for the agricultural good is saturated. 
They then examine the impact of two alternative growth strategies: i) increase in total factors 
productivity in the industrial sector, ii) increase in total factors productivity in the agricultural 
sector. They show that the impact of these strategies on poverty and inequality differs depending 
on i) the degree of openness of the economy, ii) whether the demand for the agricultural good 
by the two household classes of is saturated or not, i.e. depending on the agricultural level of 
productivity. More precisely, they show that in a closed economy, an increase in manufacturing 
productivity that leads to a drop in the price of the good produced by this sector cannot benefit 
the poor. Because of unsaturated agricultural demand, the poor do not consume the industrial 
good. In an open economy, on the other hand, a gain in market share due to an increase in the 
productivity of the exported goods sector leads to an expansion of this sector and the 
reallocation of the agricultural work towards industry contributes in this case to a real wage 
increase of landless workers.  
The article by Baland and Ray (1991) also analyzes the role of the composition of 
demand in the relationship between the distribution of the production factors and the levels of 
production and employment. They use a general equilibrium model with three goods: a staple 
good, food; a mass consumer good, clothing; and a luxury good, meat (whose production uses 
food). As in the preceding model, Engel’s law is included by prescribing a minimum of food 
consumption and with the utility of the agents depending only on their consumption of clothing  
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and meat. The agents are identical in terms of preferences and labor supply but differ in their 
endowments of land and capital. The modeling of the labor market is based on the theory of 
efficiency wage. The authors show that a change in the distribution of the production factors 
towards a less equal distribution leads to an increase in unemployment and malnutrition.  
These various models underline certain stylized facts that can explain the link between 
economic growth and inequality. They highlight in particular the importance of the parameters of 
demand for food. In the last model, one of the elements that arise from poverty is put forth: 
malnutrition constitutes one of the most widespread demonstrations of poverty. That justifies 
granting a special look at the agricultural sector when studying the links between the 
development strategy and the fight against poverty. 
 
2.2. Problems Arising from the Construction of Applied Models  
Among the tools used for the counterfactual analysis of the impact of policies and 
macroeconomic shocks on poverty and income distribution, computable general equilibrium 
models appeal because of their ability to produce disaggregated results at the microeconomic 
level, within a consistent macroeconomic framework. 
 
Functional distribution vs. personal distribution  
Applied general equilibrium models, initially built on the basis of Social Accounting 
Matrices (SAM) with one representative household, have been gradually “enriched” from the 
microeconomic point of view by constructing SAMs increasingly disaggregated at the household 
account level. This development has allowed carrying out analyses based on a "typology" of 
households characterized by different levels of income. The first two general equilibrium models 
used to study the distributive impact of various macroeconomic policies in developing 
economies are the model of Adelman and Robinson for Korea (1978) and that of Lysy and 
Taylor for Brazil (1980). The two models produced different results. The differences were  
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attributed to the differences in the structural characteristics of the two economies and the 
specifications of the models. Subsequently, Adelman and Robinson (1988) used the same two 
models again and determined that the differences were mainly due to different definitions of 
income distribution and not to different macroeconomic closures. The neoclassical approach is 
focused on the size distribution of income, essentially individualistic, while the Latin-American 
structuralist school is built on a Marxian vision of the society, which considers the society to be 
made up of classes characterized by their endowments in factors of production and whose 
interests are divergent. While the latter defends the "functional" approach of income distribution, 
which characterizes the households by their endowments of factors of production, the former 
more often adopts the "personal" approach, which is based on a classification of households 
according to their income level. The most common approach today is to use the “extended 
functional classification”, which takes into account several criteria for classifying households. 
In order to go from the income distribution among groups of households to an indicator 
of overall inequality or poverty, it is necessary to specify the income distribution within the 
groups considered. The most common approach is to assume that within each group income has 
a lognormal distribution with an endogenous average (given by the model) and a fixed variance 
(Adelman and Robinson, 1988). More recently, Decaluwé et al. (1999) proposed a numerical 
model, applied to an African prototype economy that distinguishes four household groups and 
estimates income distribution laws for each group that allow taking into account more complex 
forms of distribution than the normal law. It does not allow, however, to relax the assumption of 
fixed within-group variance of income, whose contribution to the overall inequality is often quite 
significant (in general, more than 50% of the total variance).  
 
The representative agent assumption 
Disaggregation of the SAM does not allow applied general equilibrium models to relax 
the representative agent assumption, but leads to a multiplication of representative agents. The 
widespread use of this assumption is due to the desire to give microeconomic foundations to the  
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aggregated behavior, and to establish a framework of analysis in which equilibrium is unique and 
stable. According to Kirman (1992), this assumption raises many problems. First of all, there is 
no plausible justification for the assumption that the aggregate of several individuals, even if they 
are optimizing agents, acts like an individual optimizing agent. Individual optimization does not 
necessarily generate collective rationality, nor does the fact that the community shows some 
rationality imply that the individuals who make it up act rationally. In addition, even if it is 
accepted that the choices of the aggregate can be regarded as those of an optimizing individual, 
the reaction of the representative agent to a modification of the parameters of the initial model 
can be different from the reactions of the individuals that this agent represents. Thus cases can 
exist where of two situations, the representative agent prefers the second, while each individual 
prefers the first. Finally, trying to explain the behavior of a group by that of an individual is 
constraining. The sum of the simple and plausible economic behaviors of a multitude of 
individuals can generate complex dynamics, whereas building a model of an individual whose 
behavior corresponds to these complex dynamics can result in considering an agent whose 
characteristics are very particular. In other words, the dynamic complexity of the behavior of an 
aggregate can emerge from the aggregation of heterogeneous individuals with simple behaviors.  
Our approach makes it possible to relax the representative agent assumption in two 
ways. The first is by using information at the microeconomic level - at the household or the 
individual level according to the variable being considered. The second is by estimating 
behavioral equations starting from the same microeconomic data. The estimated functions form 
part of the model, which allows endogenizing some of the behavior. The unexplained portion - 
the error term or fixed effect - remains exogenous but is preserved, which makes it possible to 
take into account elements of unexplained heterogeneity. 
 
3. Microeconomic Specifications of the Model  
The microeconomic specifications constitute the foundations of the model. From that 
perspective, our approach can be thought of as a "bottom-up" approach. The microeconomic  
9 
 
modeling choices were guided by concern for using and explaining the empirical observations. 
Agricultural households occupy a central place in the model and particular care was given to the 
specification of their labor allocation behavior. 
 
3.1. Production and Labor Allocation 
We seek to model the labor allocation of households among various activities. Three 
sectors are considered: formal, informal, and agricultural. Individuals can be wage workers or 
self-employed. Thus, we distinguish three types of activities: i) agricultural activity, ii) informal 
activity, iii) wage-earning in the formal sector. One of the original characteristics of the model is 
explicitly modeling the fact that agricultural households are producers. Traditionally, computable 
general equilibrium models represent the behavior of sectors that hire workers and pay value-
added to households through the production factor accounts. This specification does not allow 
taking into account the heterogeneity of producers, nor does it allow to represent interactions 
between production and consumption decisions.  
 
Agricultural Households  
Labor allocation models for agricultural households are the subject of an ongoing 
literature which  focuses on estimating the parameters of labor supply and demand (Skoufias, 
1994), on the question of the separability of behaviors, on characterizing the types of rationing 
faced by these households (Benjamin, 1992), and on the substitutability of various types of 
work (Jacoby, 1992 and 1993). Our approach does not constitute a contribution to these 
questions but makes use of the theoretical developments and empirical results of this work to 
construct the microeconomic foundations of the model.  
Traditionally, modeling the choices of labor allocation is considered in a context where 
wage activities are dominant. The existence of one or several labor markets makes it possible to 
refer to exogenous prices to estimate the model equations. Agricultural households have two  
10 
 
fundamental characteristics which justify the extension of traditional models of the producer and 
consumer: the dominant use of family work, and the home consumption of an often significant 
part of their own production. Standard labor market models traditionally distinguish institutions 
that supply work (households) from institutions that require work (companies). This 
representation is unsatisfactory to describe the operation of the rural labor market where 
agricultural households are institutions that both supply and require work at the same time. On 
the production side, the level of each activity, and consequently the level of labor demand, is 
determined by the maximization of profits. On the consumption side, the demand for leisure, and 
consequently the labor supply, is determined by the maximization of utility.  
The separability of demand and labor supply behavior depends on the existence and 
operation of the labor market: if it exists and functions perfectly, then the household 
independently maximizes profits (which determines its labor demand) and utility (which 
determines its labor supply). In this case, marginal productivity of on-farm labor is equal to the 
market wage and depends neither on the household’s endowment of production factors, nor on 
its consumer preferences. If, on the contrary, the market does not exist, each household 
balances its own labor supply and demand, which links its consumer preferences and its 
producer behavior. In this case, the marginal productivity of on-farm labor depends on the 
characteristics of the household. These characteristics are made up not only of observable 
elements like endowment of production factors, demographic composition, and levels of 
education and professional experience of members, but also of non observable characteristics 
such as preference for either on or off-farm work. 
Neither of these two models satisfactorily explains the real operation of the markets, 
either in Madagascar or in the majority of the developing countries. Many surveys indicate the 
simultaneous existence of a rural labor market and different marginal productivities among 
households. For instance, one typically observes a higher marginal labor productivity for bigger 
farmers. Various explanations of this phenomenon were proposed within the framework of 
studies on the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity. In his work on labor 
allocation in agricultural households, Benjamin (1992) analyzes three rationing schemes:  
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constraints on off-farm labor supply, rationing on the labor demand side, and different marginal 
productivity between family and wage work. 
In our model, off-farm and hired labor are treated in an asymmetrical way. This 
approach is justified by the observation that even households that hire agricultural wage labor 
can have low marginal productivities of labor, lower than the average observed agricultural 
wage. We thus made the assumption that hired labor is complementary to family labor. The 
validity of this assumption is reinforced by the seasonal character of the use of agricultural wage 
labor in Madagascar. Hiring is particularly important at the time of rice transplanting in irrigated 
fields. On each field, this operation must be carried out quickly, ideally in a day, so that the 
seedlings grow at the same pace and appropriate water control can be assured. Typically, rice-
grower households call upon paid work or mutual aid during this period. The technical 
coefficient related to non-family work is nevertheless specific to each household, since the 
quantity of auxiliary work depends on the demographic characteristics of the household as well 
as size of the farm.  
On the off-farm employment side, agricultural households have several possibilities, 
including agricultural or informal wage work, or an informal handicraft or commercial activity.  
Since these activities are very labor intensive even though not wage-earning, we have treated 
them as activities with constant returns to labor. Again, empirical observations determined the 
choices of specification. It is necessary to find a model that explains the observation that 
households that supply off-farm labor have low marginal productivities of on-farm labor. Among 
the possible models of rationing, we chose to consider that there are transaction costs and/or 
elements of preference, which explain this observation. The labor allocation model thus 
becomes discrete. Households that do not supply work off-farm have a marginal productivity of 
on-farm labor higher than their potential off-farm wages, adjusted for costs. Households that 
supply off-farm labor have a marginal productivity that is equal to their off-farm wages, adjusted 
for transaction costs. Since the supply of formal wage labor is completely rationed on the 
demand side, it does not enter explicitly into the labor allocation model. An exogenous shock on 
formal labor demand will nevertheless have an impact on the time available for agricultural and  
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informal activities. It will also have an impact on household income, which in turn affects total 
labor supply.  
 
Non-Agricultural Households 
Non-agricultural households supply informal and/or formal wage work. Their demand 
for leisure and consequently their total labor supply depends on their wage rate and income 
apart from labor income. Since the supply of formal wage work is completely rationed on the 
demand side, the potential impact of an exogenous shock on formal labor demand or on the 
formal wage rate is the same as that described above for agricultural households. 
 
3.2. Disposable Income, Savings, and Consumption 
Household incomes come from various sources: agricultural activities, informal activities, 
formal wages, dividends of formal capital, income from sharecropping, and transfers from other 
households and from the government. Apart from income from the formal sector and transfers, 
all incomes are endogenous in the model. Part of total income is saved, and the saving rate is 
endogenous. It is an increasing function of total income. Final consumption is represented 
through a linear expenditure system  (LES). This specification makes it possible to distinguish 
and take into account necessary expenditures and supernumerary expenditures. Finally, each 
activity consumes intermediate goods. The technical coefficients for the agricultural sector are 
household-specific.  
 
4. Description of the General Equilibrium Framework 
The general equilibrium framework is made up of equilibrium equations for goods and 
factors markets. This framework makes it possible to take into account indirect effects through 
changes in relative prices. Macroeconomic closures nevertheless are not specified explicitly. The 
implicit assumptions are that government savings and total investment are flexible, that the  
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exchange rate is fixed, and foreign savings are flexible. 
The model is a static model with three sectors: agricultural, informal, and formal. The 
agricultural sector produces two types of goods, a tradable good that is exported and a non-
tradable good. The two other sectors each produce one type of good. The informal good is a 
non-tradable good, while the formal good is tradable. The production factors are labor, land 
and formal capital. Total labor supply is endogenous and determined at the household level. The 
levels of agricultural and informal production are also determined at the household level, as is the 
agricultural labor demand. The informal labor demand is determined at the aggregate level by 
the demand for informal good and for agricultural wage labor. The supply of informal labor is 
determined at the individual level through the labor allocation model described earlier. The 
formal labor demand is exogenous. Capital stocks (land, cattle and agricultural capital for the 
agricultural sector, formal capital for the formal sector) are specific and fixed for agricultural and 
formal activities, while the capital used in the informal sector is integrated into work. Capital and 
labor are substitutable in agricultural technology represented through a Cobb-Douglas 
specification. The formal labor market operates with exogenous demand at fixed prices. The 
allocation of work between agricultural and informal production is determined at the 
microeconomic level, according to the labor allocation model described in section 3. 
Although the model is based on information at the household level, an aggregate social 
accounting matrix (SAM) with 13 accounts can be derived from the source data (Table 1). In 
this aggregated SAM, the labor factor is disaggregated into three types of work: agricultural 
family work, informal wage work and formal wage work. The household account is 
disaggregated into two accounts, one for urban households and the other for rural households. 
The formal sector account is an aggregate of private and public formal activities accounts, while 
the last account (RES) is an aggregate of the accounts of the formal firms, government, saving-
investment and rest of the world. This matrix summarizes the model accounts, which include 
4500 households, of which approximately 3500 are agricultural producers. Thus, there are 




Table 1: Social Accounting Matrix (billions of Francs Malgaches 1995) 
  AGR  INF  FOR  L1  L2  L3  T  K  M-URB  M-RUR  RES  TOT 
AGR  2 087  1 438  515            893  1 580  1 751  8 263 
INF  779  439  386            1 378  1 525    4 507 
FOR  1 168  519  5 530            2 733  2 564  347  12 
862 
L1  1 986                      1 986 
L2  170  1 598                    1 767 
L3      2 193                  2 193 
T  2 073                      2 073 
K    200  4 238                  4 439 
M-URB        221  976  1 749  231  1 848        5 024 
M-RUR        1 766  792  443  1 843  695      131  5 669 
RES    313            1 896  20      2 229 
TOT  8 263  4 507  12 
862 
1 986  1 767  2 193  2 073  4 439  5 024  5 669  2 229   
 
L1 = agricultural family labor 
L2 = informal labor 




5. An Application to Madagascar  
Some of the microeconomic functions were estimated on cross-sectional data: the 
agricultural production function and the informal income equation at the household level and the 
formal wage equation at the individual level. On the consumption side, the parameters of the 
linear expenditure system and the labor supply function could not be estimated but were 
calibrated using estimates found in the literature and data derived from the household survey and 
the SAM.  
 
5.2. Estimation Results 
The econometric techniques implemented are inspired to the extent possible by 
econometric work relating to household labor allocation. The complexity of the methods 
implemented is nevertheless limited by the need to estimate the functions on the whole sample of 
households and not just on a sub-sample. Thus, in the case of the agricultural production 
function, we did not differentiate the types of labor according to qualification or gender, because 
we did not find a well-behaved neoclassical function with satisfactory which permits null 
quantities of one of the production factors. The estimation of a function with several types of 
work would in addition have made it possible to write the labor allocation model at the level of 
individuals and not of households. To our knowledge, only Newman and Gertler (1994) have 
implemented a complete estimation of a time allocation model for agricultural households with an 
arbitrary number of members. Their specification assumes nevertheless use of only part of the 
available information, since the model estimation relies only on the observed marginal 
productivity data, i.e. wages, and uses the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to estimate the marginal 
productivity of on-farm family labor. The comparison of wages and productivities derived from 
the estimate of an agricultural production function based on the EPM93 data shows that these 





Agricultural Production Function  
Following Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994), we considered an agricultural 
production function and derived the marginal productivity of agricultural labor for each 
household. Agricultural households are defined as all those that draw an income from land. 
Other agricultural factors include agricultural equipment and livestock. The search for a function 
making it possible to take into account null quantities of inputs led us to consider estimating a 
quadratic function embedded in a Cobb-Douglas function. The quadratic form makes it possible 
to take into account several types of work and null quantities of factors. We abandoned this 
approach for two reasons. One is that the estimation results are much less satisfactory from an 
econometric point of view. The other is that the function is much less handy analytically, which 
considerably complicates the writing of the model. The Cobb-Douglas has advantages in terms 
of interpretation and handiness. Beyond the homogeneity of family work, the assumptions 
related to the use of a Cobb-Douglas function are strong: the contribution of the production 
factors are strongly separable, and the marginal rate of substitution between factors is equal to 1 
and does not depend on the other factors.  
The logarithm of agricultural value added is regressed on the logarithms of the four 
production factors (work in hours, land in hectares, endowment in value, livestock in value), and 
the average level of education of the household, as well as on variables characterizing the 
cultivated land (share of irrigated surface, share of surface in property, share of the cultures of 
cash crops) and on regional dummy variables. Because of endogeneity of certain explanatory 
variables, the ordinary least squares estimate (OLS) is likely to give biased results. The 
endogeneity bias can result from the overlap of production and input allocation decisions, and 
from fixed effects of unobserved heterogeneity. The multiplicity of the endogeneity sources does 
not permit determination of the bias direction a priori. Since the capital stock, acreage and 
livestock are considered fixed over the period considered (one year of production) and 
intermediate consumptions are deduced from the value of the production - which amounts to 
assuming that they are complementary - the only instrumented variable is the use of family work. 




the residuals of the production function. The selected IV are the demographic structure of the 
household and the age of the household head. The results of the estimates by OLS and IV 
methods are presented in Table 2. The first stage of the estimate - regression of the variable 
instrumented on the instrumental variables - indicates that the instruments are relatively powerful 
in explaining the variation of the quantities of family work applied to the agricultural activity. The 
results of the over-identification test make it possible to reject the null hypothesis of correlation 
between the residuals of the IV estimate and the instruments, while the results of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test show that the family work coefficient in the production function estimated by 
the IV is significantly different from the coefficient estimated by the OLS. The comparison of the 
results of the estimates by the OLS and the IV show that the coefficient of family work 
(corresponding to its contribution in the agricultural value added) is biased towards zero in the 
OLS estimate, since it increases from 0.27 to 0.52. The parameters corresponding to the other 
production factors decrease slightly in the IV estimate, but the total sum of the contributions of 
the production factors increases significantly (from 0.69 to 0.88) between the two estimates. 
Since this value is not significantly different from 1, one can consider a constant returns to scale 





Table 2: Results of estimations of the function of agricultural value added (OLS and 
IV) 
  OLS Standard 
errors
IV  Standard 
errors 
Log of family labor   0.268 0.023 0.521  0.081 
Log of cultivated area   0.309 0.014 0.274  0.018 
Log of endowment value  0.055 0.008 0.036  0.010 
Log of livestock value  0.058 0.004 0.049  0.005 
Schooling  0.012 0.007 0.020  0.007 
Share of irrigated area  0.274 0.054 0.251  0.056 
Share of owned area  0.251 0.044 0.223  0.046 
Share of cash crop area  0.593 0.119 0.592  0.122 
Rural sector?  0.275 0.056 0.179  0.065 
Region 1?  0.067 0.077 0.025  0.079 
Region 2?  0.409 0.076 0.292  0.085 
Region 3?  0.022 0.076 -0.017  0.078 
Region 4?  0.202 0.083 0.162  0.085 
Region 5?  -0.195 0.083 -0.197  0.084 
GDP per capita at department level  0.144 0.020 0.161  0.021 
Constant  5.723 0.197 4.400  0.455 
R²  0.483 0.460   
Over-identification
b  21.005  0.1015 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman
c  11.020  0.0001 
Number of observations  2.904 2.904   
a The dependent variable is the log of the agricultural value added. 
b Over-identification test for exclusion of instruments, Chi-square distribution under the null and 
associated probability. 
c Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for OLS specification bias, Chi-square distribution under the null 




Informal and Formal Wage Equations 
The informal wage equation was estimated at the household level (Table 3), while the 
formal wage equation was estimated at the individual level (Table 4).  
 
Table 3: Results of estimations of informal wage equation at the household level 
  OLS  Standard errors   
Schooling  0.103  0.008   
Professional Experience   0.009  0.009   
(Professional Experience)²/1000  -0.076  0.110   
Household head gender  0.184  0.056   
Informal capital  0.043  0.012   
Urban sector?  0.041  0.063   
Region 1?  -0.658  0.092   
Region 2?  -0.753  0.106   
Region 3?  -0.544  0.099   
Region 4?  -0.383  0.114   
Region 5?  -0.252  0.108   
GDP per capita at department level  0.431  0.207   
Constant  5.325  0.215   
R²  0.127     
Number of observations  2.605     
 
The independent variables are the logarithms of the wage rates. Only the results of the 
OLS estimates were retained. The results of the estimates according to the Heckman procedure 




Table 4: Results of estimations of formal wage equation at the individual level 
  OLS  Standard errors   
Schooling  0.116  0.004   
Professional Experience   0.068  0.007   
(Professional Experience)²/1000  -0.001  0.000   
Male?  0.188  0.047   
Position in the family  0.084  0.049   
Urban sector?  0.045  0.056   
Region 1?  -0.188  0.073   
Region 2?  -0.241  0.091   
Region 3?  0.060  0.082   
Region 4?  -0.142  0.088   
Region 5?  -0.115  0.087   
GDP per capita at department level  0.473  0.166   
Constant  3.583  0.155   
R²  0.413     
Number of observations  1.196     
 
The performances of the two regressions in terms of explaining the variance are 
relatively poor for the informal wage equation (R²=12.7%) and relatively good for the formal 
wage equation (R²=41.3%). Nevertheless, the results show that the coefficients of the human 
capital variables have the expected signs in the two equations: the returns to education are 
positive and significant and the returns to experience are positive in the two regressions but 
significant only in the second. The sign of the parameter of experience squared (introduced to 
take into account the decreasing returns to experience) is negative and significant in the formal 
wage regression. In addition, the outputs of education appear 5 times higher in the informal 




household in the case of the informal wage equation, and of the individual in the formal wage 
equation) is significant and positive, indicating that men have a significantly higher average wage 
rate than that of the women in the two sectors.  
 
5.3. Calibration, Parameters and Algorithm 
Calibration is a traditional stage in the construction of applied models, in particular in 
constructing general equilibrium models. In our model, calibration procedures are of several 
types. Initially, the reconciliation of the microeconomic data of 1993 with the macroeconomic 
data of 1995 was carried out using a program of recalibration of the statistical weights 
(Robilliard and Robinson, 1999). "Traditional " procedures of calibration were implemented to 
calibrate the parameters of the demand system, labor supply and the transformation function. 
The partially random drawing of potential and reservation wages is “non traditional” and 




The linear expenditure system (LES) was calibrated for each household given the 
budgetary shares derived from the household data and the SAM, the income elasticity of the 
agricultural and formal demands, and the Frisch parameter. The price elasticities and the LES 
parameters were derived from the calibration process. The outcome of this process is that 
minimal expenditures are specific to each household, as are propensities to consume 
supernumerary income. This specification leads to individual demand functions whose 
aggregation is not perfect, i.e. whose aggregate cannot be described through a function of the 
same type as the individual function. Only a specification based on marginal propensities to 





Box 1 : LES Calibration and perfect aggregation 
Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), the Linear Expenditure System writes 
( ) ￿ - + = j j i i i i i p x p q p g b g
 with 
1 = ￿ j b
 
where   i q   consumption of good i  
  x  expenditures 
  i g    subsistence consumption 
  i b    marginal propensity to consume supernumerary expenditure. 
  
LES parameter calibration requires (Dervis and al., 1982) the knowledge of income elasticities 
of the demand for each good ( ) i e , of the Frisch parameter ( ) f , and of budget shares ( ) i w . 
One can show that:      i i i w e b =  
Given that     ￿ -
-
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Consider  ih q , the consumption of good i oh household h. The LES of household h is: 
( ) ￿ - + = jh j h ih ih i ih i p x p q p g b g
 
Aggregate consumption is the sum of individual consumptions and can be written: 
( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - + = =
h




ih i i i p x p q p q p g b g
 
Aggregation is perfect, that is, aggregate consumption can be written: 
( ) ￿ - + = j j i i i i i p x p q p g b g
  with 
￿ =
h






if and only if  i h i ih b b b = = ¢ . 
 
The labor supply function was calibrated for each household given the price and income 
elasticities drawn from Jacoby (1993). The savings function was calibrated given the income 
elasticity of the marginal propensity to save. Finally, the autonomous agricultural demand was 
calibrated given the price elasticity of demand. Other calibrations include incomes derived from 
sharecropping and formal capital. 




agricultural goods produced for the local market and those produced for export. The 
formalization of this assumption is based on the specification of a function with constant elasticity 
of transformation (CET) for each agricultural household. The calibration of the CET function is 
based on the production data derived from the household survey but also requires the definition 
of the substitution elasticity between production for the local market and exports. For this 
parameter, which cannot be estimated because of the absence of a long series of data on 
production and price, an "average" value, was selected. Thereafter, various simulations were 
carried out to test the sensitivity of the results of the model to the value of this parameter. The 
values of "guesstimated" parameters of the reference simulation are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Model Parameters 
Parameter  Value 
Income elasticity   
     of agricultural demand   0.60 
     of informal demand   0.97 
     of formal demand   1.20 
Price elasticity   
     of demand agricultural  -0.40 
     of demand informal  -0.62 
     of demand formal  -0.84 
Income elasticity of labor supply  -0.06 
Price elasticity of labor supply  0.10 
Price elasticity of agricultural demand  1.50 





Potential Wage Equation  
In order to model the labor allocation choices and hiring in the formal sector, it is 
necessary to know the potential informal and formal wages for households and individuals who 
do not take part in the labor market being considered. The estimation of these wages is carried 
out on the basis of the results of the econometric estimations presented earlier. From these 
estimations one can compute informal (for each household) and formal (for each individual) 
potential wages given their specific levels of human capital and the values of the other 
explanatory variables of the regression. The next step consists of drawing the residuals, which 
represent the fixed effects. In the case of informal wages, this drawing is carried out under two 
assumptions. The first relates to the distribution of the residuals, which is assumed to be normal. 
The second relates to the labor allocation model for the agricultural households, with which the 
values of the informal potential and reservation wages must be consistent. The potential and 
reservation wage residuals are drawn under the condition that the marginal productivity of 
agricultural labor, i.e. the shadow wage of agricultural labor, is higher than the potential informal 
wage corrected by the reservation wage. In the case of the drawing of informal wages residuals 
for nonagricultural households and individual formal wages, only the assumption of normal 
distribution is retained.  
 
Equations and Heterogeneity  






Table 6: Model Equations  
  Equations  Domain  Description 
  Microeconomic Equations      
1  ( ) h h h h T Z p w w , ; 1 1 1 =   h H ˛   agricultural shadow wage 

















h H ˛  
agricultural marginal 
productivity 
4  ( ) h h h h T w p X X ; , 1 1 1 =   h H ˛   agricultural value added  




h T w L L ; 1 1 =   h H ˛   agricultural labor demand 




h Z T w p p L L , ; , , 2 1 =   h H ˛   total labor supply 






2 1 = -   h H ˛   informal labor supply 
8  h
s
h h h h V L w X p Y + ￿ + ￿ = 2 2 1 1   h H ˛   total income  
9  ( ) mps mps Y h h h =   h H ˛   marginal propensity to save 
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linear expenditure system 
  Aggregation Equations     
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i D X ct C X + ￿ + = ￿ ￿
 
i I ˛   total demand of good i 




i X X =   i I ˛   Balance equation for good i 
Indices 
i j I , ˛     activities and goods 
h H ˛    households 
Parameters 
ij ct




g b ih i ,    LES parameters for good i and household h 
h r     reservation wage labor off farm of household h 
h T     characteristics of agricultural farm of household h (land, capital livestock...) 
h Z     characteristics of household h (size, demographic composition, education,,,) 
Variables 
i p     price of i 
w h 1     shadow wage of on-farm family labor of household h  
h w2     informal wage of household h 
h w     wage of household h 
s
h L     total labor supply of household h 
d
h L1     agricultural labor demand of household h 
s
h L2     informal labor supply of household h 
h X1     agricultural value added of household h 
h Y     income of household h 
h mps    marginal propensity to save of household h 
ih C     consumption of good i of household h 
i D     autonomous demand of i 
s
i X
    aggregated supply of i 
d
i X
    aggregated demand of i 
 
The model takes into account various sources of heterogeneity at the household level. 
These differ by their demographic characteristics, by their endowments in physical and human 
capital, by their position on the labor market, and by their preferences of consumption and labor 
supply. The conservation of the residuals in the microeconomic equations makes it possible to 






Algorithm and Solution  
The model was written using the GAUSS software. The solution algorithm is a loop with 
decreasing steps that seeks the equilibrium prices that will clear excess demands for the 
agricultural good and informal labor. At each step, all the microeconomic functions of behavior 
are recomputed with new prices. Since the process of labor allocation for agricultural 
households is discrete, these can " switch " from a state of autarky (where they do not take part 
in the wage labor market) to a state of multi-activity, according to the respective values of the 
implicit on-farm wage (which depends on the price of the agricultural good) and of the 
corrected market wage (which depend on the price of informal labor). The individual demands 
and supplies are then aggregated to obtain the functions of excess demand that one seeks to 
clear. Solution time depends on the magnitude of the shocks and computational capacities 
available. As an example, the time varies between 1 and 5 minutes for the shocks considered in 
this paper on a Penthium 450 with 128 MB of read-write memory. 
 
6. Impact of Growth Shocks on Poverty and Inequality 
The first set of simulations relates to various growth shocks, corresponding to various 
development strategies. The impact of these various shocks on poverty and inequality is 
analyzed. The comparative statics of the model is studied through the analysis of the results at 
the aggregate level. The ex ante / ex post decomposition of the results makes it possible to 
emphasize the importance of the general equilibrium effects, while reading the microeconomic 
results through a detailed classification of households makes it possible to evaluate the 
contribution of endogeneizing the within-group variance of income. Some results of sensitivity 
tests for "guestimated" parameters are also presented. 
 
6.1. Some Descriptive Elements  




Ménages) survey of 1993. a national survey of the SDA type (social dimension of adjustment) 
covering 4508 households. This survey was carried out by the INSTAT (Institut National de la 
Statistique) on behalf of the Malagasy government. The macroeconomic data correspond to 
those of the Social Accounting Matrix of Madagascar for the year 1995 (Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud, 1997). This SAM, in addition, was used as the base for a computable general 
equilibrium model applied to Madagascar (Dissou, Haggblade and al., 1999). The reconciliation 
of the microeconomic data of 1993 with the macroeconomic data of 1995 was carried out using 
a program of recalibration of the statistical weights (Chapter 5). The results of the model thus 
correspond to the Malagasy economy of 1995 and are presented in constant 1995 Francs 
Malgaches. The figures in Table 7 show that the income structure differs greatly between rural 
households, whose incomes are dominated by agricultural production, and urban households, 
whose incomes are dominated by formal production factors. The consumption patterns also 
differ since the agricultural budget share is 17.9% in the urban sector and 27.9% in the rural 
sector. 
 
Table 7: Household income and consumption structure (%) 
    Income Structure  Budget Shares 
Household
s 








Cash crops Agricultural  Informal 
Urban  25.0  8.3  18.2  32.7  34.5  2.6  17.9  27.5 
Rural  75.0  60.3  13.4  7.5  11.8  10.7  27.9  26.9 
Average  100.0  35.7  15.7  19.5  22.6  6.9  23.2  27.2 
Source: EPM93. authors' calculations. 
* including cash crops. 
 
Table 8 presents various indicators of poverty and inequality as well as the distribution 






Table 8: Poverty and Inequality 
Households Weights  Welfare       Theil        P0        P1        P2        P0* 
Urban  25.0  1 627.6  90.9  43.4  17.6  9.5  41.3 
Rural  75.0  605.1  51.0  74.9  37.4  23.3  70.9 
Average  100.0  863.0  81.6  67.0  32.4  19.8  62.5 
Source: EPM93. authors' calculations. 
 
Several indicators are used for this descriptive analysis and will be used again for the 
analysis of the results. The three indicators of poverty depend on the definition of a poverty line. 
Following several analyses of poverty in Madagascar, we took the per capita "caloric" line 
which corresponds to the poverty line used at the national level and which amounts to 248.000 
1993 Francs Malgaches. This threshold corresponds to a per capita income sufficient to buy a 
minimum basket of basic foodstuffs (representing a ration of 2.100 Kcal per day) and of non-
food staples. The first indicator (P0) is that of the poverty rate. It corresponds to the share of 
the population living below the poverty line, but does not inform about the degree of poverty. 
The second indicator is that of poverty depth (P1), where the contribution of each individual to 
the aggregate indicator is larger the poorer this individual. The third indicator is the severity of 
the poverty (P2), which is sensitive to inequality among the poor. Regarding income distribution, 
only the Theil index was retained as an indicator of inequality, because of its properties. It is a 
decomposable indicator, which makes it possible to consider the respective contributions of 
within and between-group inequality to total inequality. According to these indicators and the 
chosen poverty line, 67.0% of the population is poor in Madagascar. The poverty rate is higher 
in the rural sector where it reaches 74.9% of the population. The depth and severity of poverty 
are also higher in the rural sector. On the other hand, inequality is higher in the urban sector. 
Although the average income of the urban households is 2.7 times higher than that of the rural 
households, the between-group inequality accounts for only 15% of the overall inequality.  
Table 9 shows some " structural " characteristics of the Malagasy households. These 




informal activities. Other characteristics, not observed, also contribute to heterogeneity among 
the households. Average informal labor productivity is computed for all households, since the 
estimate of informal wages enables us to calculate potential standards of informal wages for 
households for which these wages are not observed. Agricultural productivity is calculated only 





Table 9: Structural characteristics of Malagasy households  
RURAL HOUSEHOLDS           Poor         Non-poor         Average 
Informal productivity  829.2  2741.9  1458.0 
Agricultural productivity*  198.1  776.8  382.4 
Household head gender  84.1  84.3  84.2 
Schooling (years)  2.4  3.6  2.8 
Informal capital (000 Fmg)**  9.6  95.0  36.4 
Agricultural capital (000 Fmg)*  426.5  1145.7  655.5 
Area (ha)*  20.5  29.0  23.2 
Irrigated share (%)*  32.0  31.1  31.7 
Owned share (%)*  69.6  72.3  70.5 
Yields*  234.8  474.5  311.1 
URBAN HOUSEHOLDS 
Informal productivity  684.8  1718.4  1344.5 
Agricultural productivity*  215.1  1255.1  750.8 
Household head gender  75.9  80.8  79.0 
Schooling (years)  4.2  7.7  6.4 
Informal capital (000 Fmg)**  18.5  137.7  89.6 
Agricultural capital (000 Fmg)*  331.4  901.1  624.8 
Area (ha)*  11.4  19.1  15.4 
Irrigated share (%)*  41.2  44.0  42.7 
Owned share (%)*  61.4  53.6  57.4 
Yields*  487.8  574.3  532.4 
ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
Informal productivity  807.2  2340.0  1429.6 
Agricultural productivity*  199.4  855.8  422.5 
Household head gender  82.9  82.9  82.9 
Schooling (years)  2.7  5.2  3.7 
Informal capital (000 Fmg)**  11.4  114.7  52.9 
Agricultural capital (000 Fmg)*  418.9  1105.3  652.2 
Area (ha)*  19.8  27.4  22.4 
Irrigated share (%)*  32.8  33.2  32.9 
Owned share (%)*  69.0  69.2  69.0 
Yields*  255.1  491.0  335.3 
Source: EPM93. authors' calculations. 
* average computed on agricultural households. 





Not surprisingly, poor households are characterized by low labor productivity in the two 
traditional sectors. The weakness of these levels of productivity is related to low levels of 
endowments in human and physical capital. Poor households’ levels of education (measured in 
years of schooling) are nearly 2 times lower than those of non-poor households, and their 
average level of informal capital (measured in value for the households which have an informal 
activity) is 10 times lower. Surprisingly, the informal labor productivity appears higher in the 
rural sector than in the urban environment, in spite of lower levels of endowment in human and 
physical capital. The parameter of the dummy variable for the urban sector is not significantly 
different from zero in the equation of informal income. This result can nevertheless be explained 
by the shortage of formal goods in the rural sector, for which informal activities may be 
substituted. The endowment of production factors of the urban households is higher overall, 
except with regard to the agricultural endowment.  
 
6.2. Description of the Growth Shocks 
Several strategies of development can be considered for the Malagasy economy: either 
continuation of a formal sector "push", through development of the "Zone Franche", or the 
massive investment in the development of the agricultural sector which suffered from 
underinvestment during the last decades and whose performance is poor. In the agricultural 
sector, efforts can be focused either on tradable crops (cultivation of cash crops, coffee-vanilla-






Table 10: Simulations Table 
Simulation  Description 
EMBFOR  Formal hiring and increase in dividends  
SALFOR  Increase in formal wages and in dividends 
PGFAGRI  Increase of the Total Factor Productivity in the agricultural sector 
PGFALIM  Increase of the Total Factor Productivity in the food-crop sector 
PGFRENT  Increase of the Total Factor Productivity in the cash-crop sector 
PRXRENT  Increase of the world price of cash crops 
 
The first two simulations relate to an increase in formal sector value added. Given the 
model structure, formal value added comes from two production factors. In the first simulation 
(EMBFOR), formal sector growth corresponds to the creation of new companies and thus to 
an increase in the capital stock and employment. It is simulated through an increase in income 
coming from dividends for shareholders, and from formal labor demand. This increase is 
simulated through the sampling of individuals from the non-working and non-formal working 
population. The hiring schema is partially random. Its structure is defined in terms of gender, 
age, education, and sector (rural/urban). This structure was derived from the household data 
and corresponds to the structure of formal employment during the last five years. In addition, 
individuals whose agricultural or informal incomes are higher than their potential formal wages 
are excluded from the drawing. Lastly, all sampled individuals are employed on a full-time basis 
whatever their former level of occupation. Consequently, if an individual is hired in the formal 
sector, less time but more exogenous income is available at the household level.  
In the second simulation (SALFOR), value added paid to formal labor increases 
through a formal wage increase but with no effect on employment. The value added of formal 
capital increases as in the preceding simulation. The direct effect of this shock is an increase in 
the incomes of households receiving formal wages. Compared to the preceding simulation, one 





The following simulations relate to the agricultural sector. The first simulation 
(PGFAGRI) considers an increase in total factor productivity for all agricultural households. 
This leads to an increase in agricultural income and agricultural production. In the next simulation 
(PGFALIM), the increase in productivity relates to only food production. The last two 
simulations relate to cash crops. In simulation PGFRENT, we examine the effect of an increase 
in the productivity of cash-crop production. In PRXRENT, we simulate the impact of an 
increase in cash-crop world prices. In both cases, a positive impact on the agricultural terms of 
trade is expected.  
 
6.3. Ex ante / Ex post Decomposition of the Impact of Growth Shocks  
In order to emphasize the contribution of the general equilibrium framework, we present 
the results of simulation ex ante and ex post (Table 11 to 13). The ex ante results correspond to 
the results of a microsimulation model with microeconomic behaviors and fixed prices, whereas 
the ex post results correspond to a microsimulation model with microeconomic behaviors and 
endogenous relative prices.  
In the first simulation (EMBFOR), the hiring shock decreases the quantity of working 
time available for the traditional activities, which, ex ante, leads to a reduction in the agricultural 
(-0.1%) and informal (-1.2%) value added. At the same time, the increase in available income 
(+4.3%) leads to an increase in the demand for consumer goods. The combination of a lower 
production and an increase in consumption is likely to lead to an increase of relative prices of 
traditional goods. This is what we can observe ex post, where the prices of the traditional goods 
increase by 4.3% for the agricultural food crop and by 3.8% for the informal good. This change 
in relative prices of agricultural and informal goods determines the effect on the real income of 
each household, according to the structure of its income and consumption. Ex ante, the effect of 
the shock on inequality is negative: the Theil index increases by 3.0%. The increase in inequality 
is stronger in the rural (+4.7%) than in urban sector (+1.6). The between-group inequality also 




non-formal households through the increase of relative prices of traditional goods. This 
mechanism does not affect the extent of the welfare shock but does affect its distribution. The 
increase in per capita income is actually stronger in the rural sector than in the urban 
environment, which induces a reduction in between-group inequality (-3.2%). This reduction, 
however, does not compensate for the increase in within-group inequality (+1.4%) and, overall, 
inequality measured by the Theil index increases by 0.8%. The combination of the average 
income per capita growth (+5.0% ex post) and the fall in inequality leads to a reduction in the 






Table 11: Ex ante/Ex post decomposition of simulation results (percent change to base year) 
  BASE  EMBFOR  SALFOR  PGFAGRI  PGFALIM  PGFRENT  PRXRENT 
    Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post 
Agricultural Price  1.0  0.0  4.3  0.0  3.6  0.0  -4.0  0.0  -4.5  0.0  0.5  0.0  3.5 
Informal Price  1.0  0.0  3.8  0.0  3.2  0.0  -1.3  0.0  -2.3  0.0  0.9  0.0  4.0 
Value Added                           
     agricultural  4 017  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.1  9.9  8.1  8.0  6.8  1.9  1.5  1.1  0.3 
     informal  1 767  -1.2  3.4  0.0  3.3  -19.4  4.9  -16.0  4.5  -4.9  0.6  -8.6  0.4 
     formal  4 736  11.1  11.1  10.0  10.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
     total  10 520  4.7  5.3  4.5  4.9  0.5  4.2  0.4  3.6  -0.1  0.7  -1.0  1.3 
Production                           
     Food crop  6 695  -0.2  -0.3  0.0  -0.1  9.9  8.7  9.1  8.3  0.8  0.5  -0.3  -2.4 
     Cash crop  1 568  0.1  -2.7  0.1  -2.2  9.7  11.5  3.5  5.6  6.3  5.8  6.7  1.3 
Hours worked                           
     agricultural  7 622  -0.5  -0.9  0.0  -0.3  3.6  -0.4  3.4  0.6  0.3  -0.7  1.5  0.5 
     informal  2 026  -2.1  0.8  0.0  2.2  -13.9  1.9  -13.2  -2.2  -1.0  3.2  -5.7  -0.6 
     formal  1 244  6.6  6.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
     total  10 892  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3 
Consumption                           
     agricultural  2 473  2.6  2.1  2.4  2.0  0.3  3.1  0.2  2.8  -0.1  0.3  0.4  0.5 
     informal  2 903  4.2  3.6  4.0  3.4  0.5  3.6  0.4  3.4  -0.1  0.3  0.6  0.5 
     formal  5 297  5.2  7.0  4.9  6.3  0.6  3.6  0.4  2.7  -0.1  0.9  0.8  3.0 





Table 12: Ex ante/Ex post decomposition of simulation results (percent change to base year) 
  BASE  EMBFOR  SALFOR  PGFAGRI  PGFALIM  PGFRENT  PRXRENT 
    Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post  Ex ante  Ex post 
Income per capita                           
     urban  1 628  5.4  4.2  6.7  5.9  -0.2  1.9  -0.2  1.6  0.0  0.2  0.3  -0.0 
     rural  605  4.0  5.8  1.9  3.5  1.1  5.0  0.9  4.2  -0.2  1.0  1.0  3.4 
     all  863  4.7  5.0  4.2  4.7  0.5  3.5  0.4  3.0  -0.1  0.6  0.6  1.7 
Theil Index                           
     urban  90.9  1.6  -1.0  3.0  2.0  0.2  -0.8  0.3  -0.0  -0.1  -0.7  -0.2  -1.8 
     rural  51.0  4.7  5.9  3.3  3.1  -2.3  0.3  0.2  9.4  -4.4  -5.5  -4.9  -3.1 
     all  81.6  3.0  0.8  4.6  3.1  -1.2  -1.5  -0.2  2.0  -1.4  -2.5  -2.0  -3.4 
Within Theil   70.0  3.0  1.4  3.8  2.8  -1.0  -0.8  0.1  3.3  -1.7  -2.6  -2.1  -2.8 
Between Theil   11.6  2.8  -3.2  10.1  5.0  -2.7  -6.2  -2.2  -5.3  0.4  -1.7  -1.5  -7.0 
Poverty (P0)                           
     urban  43.4  -3.9  -3.3  -2.5  -2.1  2.9  -2.6  2.9  -1.8  0.0  -0.5  -0.4  -1.2 
     rural  74.9  -1.2  -2.4  -0.3  -1.5  -2.9  -3.9  -1.9  -2.0  -1.7  -2.7  -1.4  -3.2 
     all  67.0  -1.7  -2.6  -0.7  -1.6  -2.0  -3.7  -1.2  -2.0  -1.4  -2.3  -1.2  -2.9 
Gap (P1)                           
     urban  17.6  -7.1  -8.9  -3.9  -5.0  1.6  -3.7  1.7  -1.9  -0.1  -1.6  -0.5  -2.9 
     rural  37.4  -1.9  -3.6  -0.4  -2.1  -0.4  -4.6  0.1  -2.4  -0.4  -2.1  -1.6  -3.9 
     all  32.4  -2.6  -4.3  -0.9  -2.5  -0.1  -4.5  0.3  -2.3  -0.3  -2.0  -1.5  -3.8 
Severity (P2)                           
     urban  9.5  -9.4  -11.5  -3.3  -5.2  2.2  -3.8  2.4  -1.6  -0.1  -2.0  -0.1  -3.2 
     rural  23.3  -2.5  -4.2  -0.3  -2.2  0.7  -5.6  1.2  -2.9  -0.3  -2.6  -1.6  -4.7 




In the second simulation (SALFOR), formal value added growth results in an increase in 
the incomes of households receiving formal wages and/or dividends. This increase in incomes 
induces an increase in the demand for consumer goods. The shock thus results ex post in an 
increase in the relative prices of traditional goods. Regarding inequality, the Theil index increases 
by 4.6% ex ante and 3.1% ex post. The increase in between-group inequality is particularly 
strong ex ante (+10.1%) because of the concentration of formal incomes in the urban sector, 
but within-group inequality also increases (+3.8%). Households receiving formal wages are 
indeed, on average, richer and the improvement of their income thus contributes to increased 
inequality. Ex post, the impact on inequality remains regressive (the Theil index increases by 
2.8%), in spite of a weaker increase in the between-group Theil (+5.0%). This result is 
explained by the redistribution effect through an increase of traditional goods prices. In spite of 
the increase in inequality, the rate of poverty decreases ex ante (-0.7%) and ex post (-1.6%), 
thanks to the big increase in income. The P1 and P2 indicators also decrease, indicating that the 
growth also benefits the poorest of the poor. The reduction in poverty is nevertheless smaller 
than in the preceding simulation. That is explained by the nature of the shock, which is not, in 
itself, redistributive, in contrast to the formal hiring shock.  
The first simulation concerning the agricultural sector (PGFAGRI) leads to an increase in 
production and agricultural income. Ex ante, the effect on production corresponds to the 
productivity shock (+10.0%), but the income effect is much weaker. This result can be 
explained by the specification of the household labor allocation model. The productivity increase 
induces an increase in agricultural labor demand for the multi-activity (non-autarkic) agricultural 
households. For these, the price of the agricultural work is fixed ex ante since it is equal to the 
informal (market) wage. However, because the demand curve moves, agricultural labor demand 
increases. This increase leads these households to decrease their supply of informal work, 
because the total number of hours worked does not change. For households that reallocate 
work towards the agricultural activity, monetary income can decrease if the shadow agricultural 
wage remains lower than the informal wages. In the case of autarkical agricultural households 




on the productivity of the agricultural production) compensates for this displacement. Ex post, 
the reduction in the agricultural goods price (-4.0%) induced by the increase in production 
reduces the direct effect on monetary income for agricultural households. The reduction in the 
relative prices of traditional goods leads nevertheless to a strong increase in real income for all 
households and the increase in agricultural productivity results in an increase of ex post 
household consumption of 3.5%. The reduction in the price of the agricultural good mitigates the 
effect of the ex ante reallocation of labor and induces an ex post reallocation towards informal 
activities, leading to an increase in informal production and, consequently, to a reduction in the 
price of the informal good. Regarding inequality, the shock to agricultural productivity results in 
a reduction ex ante (-1.2%) and ex post (-1.5%) of the Theil index. All the indicators of poverty 
decrease in both cases. Ex post, the urban households benefit from the drop in the traditional 
prices of the good and their average income increases by 1.9%.  
In the next simulation (PGFALIM), the aggregate results are largely the same. The 
reduction in the relative prices of the traditional goods leads to the reallocation of labor among 
traditional activities. This reallocation leads nevertheless to an a priori surprising result: in spite of 
the ex post reduction in hours worked in the informal sector (-2.2%) (because of the increase in 
agricultural hours), the quantity of informal value added increases by 4.5%. This result is 
explained by a selection effect: the "new " informal hours are more efficient than the old ones. 
This effect is related to the characteristics of the households that move back to the agricultural 
sector: these households have lower levels of human capital as well as less physical capital than 
the households that keep their informal activity or start such activity. Ex ante, the productivity 
shock on the Theil index is progressive but weak (-0.2%). Ex post, the effect on the Theil index 
is regressive (+2.0%). The inequality increase in the rural sector is particularly strong (+9.4%). 
This can be explained by the selection effect described earlier and by the specifications of the 
time allocation model. The households that move back to the agricultural activity lose in terms of 
monetary income. Given that these are the households that have the lowest labor productivity, 
and thus the lowest incomes, inequality increases. 




simulate an increase in the productivity of cash crop production. The shock in terms of overall 
income growth is much smaller than in the two preceding simulations, because only a minority of 
households produces cash crops. In addition, the effect on the traditional goods terms of trade 
is positive, which can be explained by the fact that there is, ex ante, a significant reduction in 
informal production (-4.9%), without a significant reduction in demand, and, especially, without 
too strong an increase in the production of agricultural food crop (+0.8%). The two sectors 
being mutually dependent through the labor allocation model, it is, in this case, the ex ante 
imbalance of the informal goods market that determines ex post the evolution of the prices of the 
two non-tradable goods. The terms of trade evolution induces a redistribution effect that 
contributes to a decrease in inequality. Contrary to the preceding simulation, the fall in the rate 
of poverty is more significant in the rural than in the urban sector, which is also explained by the 
evolution of the terms of trade. The other indicators of poverty also decrease. PRXRENT 
simulates the impact of an increase in world prices of the cash crops. This shock leads ex ante 
to a reduction in the production of nontradable goods and to an increase in the demand for 
these same goods. Ex post, these imbalances lead to a rise in the relative prices of the traditional 
goods. Ex post, the impact on the average income per capita is negative for the urban 
households and positive for the rural households. As a result, the between-group Theil 
decreases. The rate of poverty increases slightly in the urban sector and decreases in the rural 





Table 13: Ex ante/Ex post decomposition of simulation results: transition matrices 
EMBFOR      EX ANTE      EX POST   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.6 0.4 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 0.9 99.1 100.0 2.4 97.6 100.0 
  100.0 55.7 44.3 100.0 56.2 43.8 100.0 
   
SALFOR   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 1.5 98.5 100.0 
  100.0 55.4 44.6 100.0 56.0 44.0 100.0 
   
PGFAGRI   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.9 0.1 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 24.6 75.4 100.0 6.3 93.7 100.0 
  100.0 66.4 33.6 100.0 58.2 41.8 100.0 
   
PGFALIM   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.6 0.4 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 21.9 78.1 100.0 7.5 92.5 100.0 
  100.0 65.2 34.8 100.0 58.5 41.5 100.0 
   
PGFRENT   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.5 0.5 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 3.4 96.6 100.0 1.9 98.1 100.0 
  100.0 56.9 43.1 100.0 56.0 44.0 100.0 
   
PRXRENT   
  mono 1-mono mono 1-mono  
mono0  55.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.4 0.6 100.0 
1-mono0  44.6 17.8 82.2 100.0 9.6 90.4 100.0 





6.4. Decomposition of the Microeconomic Results by Group 
The presentation of the microeconomic results according to a detailed typology makes it 
possible to illustrate one of the aspects of the contribution of the microsimulation model to the 
study of the links between growth, distribution and poverty. In the standard computable general 
equilibrium models built on a disaggregated social accounting matrix, it is common to assume 
that the income distribution by group has a more or less simple statistical form, whose first-order 
moments can be determined endogenously by the model. The most common assumption is that 
this distribution is lognormal with endogenous mean and fixed variance. In other words, this 
specification allows endogenizing the between-group variance of income but rests on the 
assumption that the within-group variance is fixed. The microsimulation model makes it possible 
to relax this last assumption. In order to measure the sensitivity of the results to this assumption 
in terms of inequalities and poverty, we analyze the microeconomic results of simulations of 
positive and negative growth shocks through a detailed classification of the households into 14 
groups. This classification is based on a typology of the Malagasy households starting from the 
EPM 93 carried out for the construction of a Social Accounting Matrix of Madagascar for the 
year 1995 (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 1997). This SAM, in addition, was used as the base 
year for a general equilibrium model applied to Madagascar (Dissou, Haggblade and al., 1999). 
Table 14 shows the characteristics of these various groups in terms of income and consumption 
structures. The classification criteria are multiple. The first is by sector: the first 4 groups are 
urban and the 8 last are rural. The 4 urban groups are differentiated according to the 
qualification level and gender of the household head. Among rural households, one distinguishes 
agricultural households (the first 6) from nonagricultural households (the last 2). Agricultural 
households are distinguished according to the region (4 agro-ecological regions) and the area 
they cultivate (2 classes). Lastly, the two nonagricultural rural households are distinguished 




Table 14: Structure of Income and Consumption by group 
    Income Structure  Budget Shares 










Agricultural  Informal 
1  5.0  0.8  9.8  36.3  49.2  0.0  14.0  27.0 
2  7.8  4.4  21.3  38.5  27.7  0.1  18.2  28.4 
3  10.1  27.5  25.9  24.6  15.2  10.1  24.1  27.2 
4  3.5  14.1  41.3  14.9  11.6  2.7  23.1  28.7 
5  14.4  59.0  16.3  0.4  13.9  0.0  30.2  26.1 
6  3.4  69.0  9.4  0.0  12.8  0.1  27.3  27.2 
7  10.8  74.9  6.8  3.5  8.5  23.0  32.7  25.3 
8  8.9  82.2  8.5  2.3  3.2  39.0  29.6  26.3 
9  5.0  67.3  15.6  6.4  0.3  0.0  21.0  29.7 
10  3.0  72.9  10.0  2.4  4.7  0.0  22.6  29.0 
11  6.6  44.9  9.4  1.8  38.2  0.3  27.7  26.4 
12  3.3  64.6  4.6  1.5  24.1  1.0  26.1  27.5 
13  10.3  49.3  23.1  17.4  5.3  4.9  27.1  27.4 
14  7.7  33.9  22.0  26.1  11.4  2.9  23.3  28.5 
Total/Moy 100.0  35.7  15.7  19.5  22.6  6.9  23.2  27.2 
 
Two measurements of the poverty rate are presented. The first (P0) corresponds to 
counting the number of households below the poverty line, based on the results of the 
microsimulation model. The second (P0*) corresponds to the computation of the poverty rate 
under the standard assumption of a lognormal distribution of the within-group income, with 
endogenous mean and fixed variance. Table 15 gives a static image of the differences between 
the two measures. At the aggregated level, P0* underestimates the poverty rate, but the results 
differ according to groups. Thus, for example, P0* over-estimates the poverty rate of the first 
two groups, but underestimates it for the two following groups. Systematic bias does not appear 
in the measurement, which suggests that the within group distributions of incomes are complex 





Table 15: Poverty and Inequality 
Group  Weights  Welfare  Theil  P0  P1  P2  P0* 
1  4.7  3950.2  71.9  8.1  2.2  0.9  11.8 
2  7.9  1418.1  69.6  34.5  12.4  6.3  37.2 
3  11.2  869.3  71.9  63.1  28.2  16.0  59.7 
4  3.0  749.8  56.8  66.1  30.4  18.1  62.9 
5  15.3  453.5  49.8  85.5  46.8  30.3  82.0 
6  3.0  823.9  31.5  50.1  20.5  11.7  52.4 
7  12.0  452.4  33.1  81.8  42.3  27.0  80.2 
8  7.6  1054.5  50.7  50.2  16.3  8.2  44.6 
9  5.3  320.4  52.7  92.1  59.0  43.9  86.6 
10  2.0  775.4  52.6  63.0  32.7  19.9  62.3 
11  7.4  697.7  68.8  76.3  36.5  21.2  69.3 
12  2.5  965.5  48.8  60.9  22.0  10.9  50.1 
13  12.7  439.9  24.6  83.9  41.3  24.4  80.1 
14  5.4  986.2  33.6  48.5  16.0  7.4  43.4 
0  100.0  863.0  81.6  67.0  32.4  19.8  62.5 
* computed under the lognormal distribution assumption. 
 
The ex post evolution of the two poverty measures for six growth shocks is presented in 
Tables 16 and 17. The first three are positive shocks and correspond to the two growth shocks 
of the formal value added (EMBFOR and SALFOR) and to the increase in the total factor 
productivity in the agriculture sector (PGFAGRI) described earlier. The three following shocks 





Table 16: Comparison of two poverty measures: positive growth shocks 
    EMBFOR(+10%)  SALFOR (+10%)  PGFAGRI (+10%) 
Group  Weights d(welfare)  d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*)  d(welfare)  d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*)  d(welfare) d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*) 
1  4.7  2.1  1.4  6.2  -2.8  7.2  1.0  -3.0  -10.0  1.4  -0.1  -5.6  -2.4 
2  7.9  3.0  0.3  -2.6  -3.8  5.7  2.0  -3.7  -5.2  2.2  -0.8  -2.0  -2.8 
3  11.2  4.8  -2.4  -3.6  -4.2  4.3  1.8  -1.1  -2.3  2.7  -1.1  -2.6  -2.0 
4  3.0  5.0  -5.6  -5.9  -6.1  3.0  2.5  -1.3  -1.6  3.0  -0.8  -1.3  -2.0 
5  15.3  1.6  2.1  -0.8  -0.4  2.0  3.8  -0.8  -0.3  6.0  -1.7  -4.1  -2.7 
6  3.0  2.3  0.6  -10.4  -2.1  2.7  2.1  -10.4  -2.1  4.5  -0.7  -8.2  -4.7 
7  12.0  2.8  1.6  -1.2  -1.0  3.4  3.7  -1.3  -1.1  5.4  -1.0  -2.1  -2.4 
8  7.6  4.3  5.4  -1.0  -3.5  4.0  3.5  -0.8  -3.5  7.2  3.5  -16.5  -6.2 
9  5.3  59.9  20.2  -11.5  -7.9  1.6  1.9  -0.1  -0.2  6.0  -1.7  -2.0  -1.4 
10  2.0  2.6  -1.6  -2.3  -2.2  1.3  1.5  -0.1  -0.5  7.7  2.7  -1.2  -4.0 
11  7.4  3.0  1.4  -2.3  -1.4  4.2  4.9  -1.7  -1.2  3.6  -2.7  -2.7  -2.9 
12  2.5  2.3  1.0  -4.3  -1.8  3.4  2.9  -4.3  -2.2  4.4  -1.4  -14.3  -4.8 
13  12.7  3.7  -0.8  -0.9  -1.8  5.2  2.2  -1.8  -2.1  2.5  1.8  -0.6  -0.9 
14  5.4  3.0  2.1  -3.7  -2.7  4.3  3.1  -3.5  -3.7  2.8  -0.4  -4.8  -3.8 






Table 17: Comparison of two poverty measures: negative growth shocks 
    SALFOR (-10%)  PGFAGRI (-10%)  PRXRENT (-10%) 
Group  Weights d(welfare)  d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*)  d(welfare) d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*)  d(welfare)  d(Theil)  d(P0)  d(P0*) 
1  4.7  -7.6  -1.2  36.1  12.3  -2.0  0.0  19.8  3.3  1.1  0.8  7.6  -1.0 
2  7.9  -6.1  -2.1  10.1  6.2  -2.7  1.4  8.3  4.2  -0.4  2.5  5.8  2.0 
3  11.2  -4.5  -1.8  1.8  2.6  -2.9  1.3  2.3  2.4  -2.0  1.6  2.1  1.9 
4  3.0  -3.1  -2.8  5.0  1.7  -3.2  0.9  3.5  2.3  -2.5  2.7  3.5  2.2 
5  15.3  -2.4  -3.0  0.3  0.6  -5.6  4.4  1.4  2.8  -4.9  5.7  1.7  2.6 
6  3.0  -2.6  -2.2  1.1  2.2  -4.2  1.2  2.7  4.9  -3.3  2.6  -0.7  4.1 
7  12.0  -2.2  -2.8  0.3  0.8  -4.6  2.4  2.3  2.4  -2.5  5.8  1.3  1.8 
8  7.6  -3.3  -9.3  3.7  2.2  -7.5  -12.5  11.1  5.7  -4.0  -5.2  10.1  3.5 
9  5.3  -1.9  -1.2  0.0  0.3  -6.4  3.9  0.5  1.7  -5.4  4.2  0.4  1.4 
10  2.0  -1.9  -1.0  2.9  0.9  -6.4  2.3  4.3  4.9  -4.7  3.0  4.3  4.0 
11  7.4  -4.4  -5.6  2.1  1.3  -3.8  2.4  5.3  3.0  -2.0  4.9  5.3  2.5 
12  2.5  -3.4  -3.5  0.0  2.1  -4.4  0.8  2.0  4.9  -2.6  1.7  2.0  3.4 
13  12.7  -4.4  -1.0  1.5  2.0  -1.4  1.2  -0.1  0.8  -0.2  4.3  0.1  0.6 
14  5.4  -4.6  -2.9  0.2  4.4  -3.1  1.4  0.9  4.8  -2.0  3.8  3.1  4.4 
0  100.0  -4.7  -3.9  1.8  1.8  -3.6  1.1  2.7  2.9  -1.6  3.0  2.4  2.2  
  -47-
In the first two simulations, d(P0*) slightly overestimates the overall decrease in the 
poverty rate. However, the difference in absolute value among the variations of the two 
measures does not appear significant. In the third simulation, on the other hand, the 
underestimation bias in the total fall of poverty is much more significant since the difference 
reaches 30% of d(P0). In all three simulations, the existence or the absence of bias in P0* does 
not seem to be correlated with the evolution of inequality (the Theil index increases slightly in 
EMBFOR, more strongly increases in SALFOR and decreases in PGFAGRI). At the 
disaggregated level, there is a greater contrast, since P0* underestimates or overestimates the 
evolution of poverty differently according to groups. In most cases, the direction of the evolution 
is preserved, but the amplitude of the bias varies greatly. In the simulations of negative growth 
shocks, P0* gives relatively satisfactory results at the aggregate level in terms of direction and 
magnitude. The differences between the two measures are very small. At the disaggregated 
level, changes in P0* are in the same direction as changes in P0 but the variations magnitude 
between two measurements appear to be significant.  
Table 18 presents a decomposition of the Theil index as well as a "theoretical" measure, 
i.e. calculated under the assumption of fixed within-group variance of income. The results show 
that within and between-group Theil do not necessarily evolve in the same direction, and that the 
assumption of fixity of the within variance can result in most cases in underestimating the 
evolution of total inequality. 
 
Table 18: Decomposition of the Theil index 
  BASE  EMBFOR  SALFOR  PGFAGRI  SALFOR-  PGFAGRI-  PRXRENT- 
Theil 
Within  
56.9  1.2  2.5  -0.7  -3.2  0.4  2.1 
Theil 
Between  
24.7  -5.3  4.4  -3.6  -5.5  2.7  4.4 
Theil 
total 
81.6  -0.7  3.1  -1.5  -3.9  1.1  6.0 
Theil 
total* 
81.6  -1.6  1.3  -1.1  -1.7  0.8  1.5 
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The comparison of changes in the two measures of poverty rate shows that "theoretical" 
measurement gives relatively satisfactory results at the aggregate level insofar as the bias 
appears most of the time to be relatively small. Nevertheless, this result holds for relatively small 
growth shocks, as it be can expected that the bigger the shocks, the larger the bias. At the 
disaggregated level, the assumption appears much less satisfactory, because the bias is 
significant and nonsystematic.  
 
6.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
Some parameters of the model could not be estimated for lack of adequate data. This is 
the case for the LES parameters and, in particular, for price and income elasticities for 
agricultural demand. It is also the case for the elasticity of substitution of the CET and the price 
elasticity of the autonomous demand for food crops. Although the latter represents only a very 
small share of total demand, its sensitivity to the variations of the price of the food crop is 
nevertheless important for ex post equilibrium. The redistribution effects through the 
improvement of the traditional goods terms of trade described in the previous simulations of 
formal growth shocks are likely to be particularly sensitive to the agricultural demand 
parameters (see Bourguignon, 1990). In order to illustrate this point, we present the results of 
simulation SALFOR with various values of parameters of agricultural demand. Table 19 
presents the values of the six sets of parameters. Given the specification of the demand system, 
it is not possible to vary the income elasticity of the agricultural demand without also changing 
the values of other parameters of the system. The income elasticity retained in simulations 
SALFOR-S1 and SALFOR-S2 correspond to low and high assumptions for the value of this 
parameter respectively. In simulation SALFOR-S3, the price elasticity of agricultural demand is 
divided by two compared to S0. In simulations SALFOR-S4 and SALFOR-S5 we consider 
two extreme values of the price elasticity of autonomous demand.  
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Table 19: Sensitivity Analysis: simulations parameters 
  S0  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Income elasticity-  0.6  0.3  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Price elasticity-  -0.4  -0.2  -0.5  -0.2  -0.4  -0.4 
Price elasticity of export demand  -10.0  -10.0  -10.0  -10.0  0.0  -50.0 
 
The macroeconomic impact of the shock of formal wages varies little among various 
simulations (Table 20). The agricultural value added is almost constant because of the rigidity of 
production, while the increase in the informal value added is greater or less according to the 
difference between the relative prices of the two traditional goods. The extent of the shock in 
terms of growth (measured by the overall consumption) does not vary among simulations.  
 
Table 20: Sensitivity Analysis of aggregate results for simulation SALFOR 
  BASE  S0  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Agricultural Price   1.0  3.6  3.1  4.1  4.1  8.2  1.3 
Informal Price   1.0  3.2  2.8  3.6  3.6  6.9  1.2 
Agricultural VA   4 017  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2 
Informal VA   1 767  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.6  2.5  3.7 
Total 
Consumption 
10 673  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.4  4.5 
 
Regarding inequality and poverty, the simulation results relating to the parameters of 
agricultural demand (Table 21) do not make it possible to highlight the sensitivity of the 
indicators of inequality and poverty: the extent of the redistribution effects is largely the same in 
the first four simulations. 
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Table 21: Sensitivity Analysis of Disaggregated Results for Simulation SALFOR 
  BASE  S0  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Income per 
capita 
             
     urban  1 628  5.9  6.1  5.8  5.8  4.8  6.5 
     rural  605  3.5  3.4  3.6  3.7  4.4  3.1 
     all  863  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.7 
Theil Index               
     urban  90.9  2.0  2.1  1.9  1.9  1.2  2.5 
     rural  51.0  3.1  3.2  3.0  3.0  1.5  3.8 
     all  81.6  3.1  3.3  2.9  2.9  1.3  4.0 
Theil within  70.0  2.8  2.9  2.6  2.6  1.4  3.5 
Theil between  11.6  5.0  5.5  4.6  4.5  1.0  7.2 
Poverty (P0)               
     urban  43.4  -2.1  -2.5  -2.1  -2.1  -2.4  -3.1 
     rural  74.9  -1.5  -1.3  -1.6  -1.7  -3.0  -0.9 
     all  67.0  -1.6  -1.5  -1.7  -1.7  -2.9  -1.2 
Gap (P1)               
     urban  17.6  -5.0  -5.0  -5.0  -5.1  -5.2  -4.7 
     rural  37.4  -2.1  -2.0  -2.2  -2.3  -3.0  -1.6 
     all  32.4  -2.5  -2.4  -2.6  -2.7  -3.3  -2.0 
Severity (P2)               
     urban  9.5  -5.2  -5.1  -5.3  -5.4  -5.7  -4.5 
     rural  23.3  -2.2  -2.1  -2.3  -2.4  -2.8  -1.7 
     all  19.8  -2.6  -2.5  -2.7  -2.8  -3.2  -2.1 
 
Although this result is reassuring as far as the robustness of the model is concerned, it is 
frustrating regarding the illustration of the point mentioned above. The sensitivity test relating to 
the price elasticity of the autonomous agricultural demand fills this objective better. The values of 
price elasticity used for that purpose are extreme values. They make it possible to consider two 
situations: in SALFOR-S4 the food agricultural good is a purely nontradable good. Conversely, 
in SALFOR-S5 the food agricultural good is treated like a tradable good. The results of these 
simulations highlight the importance of the characteristics of the food crop regarding its  
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"tradability" in the effect of redistribution of the shocks of modern growth. In the first simulation, 
the shock of formal growth is largely redistributed to the rural households through the 
improvement of the traditional goods terms of trade. The income increase is the same one for 
the two groups of households, the increase in inequality remains weak and, consequently, the 
impact on poverty indicators is stronger than in the reference simulation.  
 
In order to supplement the sensitivity analysis, we also show the results of simulation 
PGFAGRI of an increase in TFP in the agricultural sector with various values of the parameters 
of the agricultural demand (Tables 22 and 23). 
 
Table 22: Sensitivity Analysis of aggregate results for simulation PGFAGRI 
  BASE  S0  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Agricultural Price   1.0  -4.0  -4.4  -3.7  -4.2  -10.0  -1.1 
Informal Price   1.0  -1.3  -1.6  -1.0  -1.5  -6.6  1.2 
Agricultural VA   4 017  8.1  8.1  8.1  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Informal VA   1 767  4.9  5.3  4.8  4.7  6.1  4.3 
Total Consumption   10 673  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.6  3.5 
 
Again, the model results are not very sensitive to elasticities of agricultural demand of 
households and the last two simulations, bearing on the price elasticity of the autonomous 
demand, make it possible to illustrate the question of the sensitivity of the poverty and 
inequalities indicators to variations of the agricultural terms of trade. Thus, when the food good 
is treated like a non-tradable good (PGFAGRI-S4), the benefits of agricultural productivity 
growth are redistributed to the urban households, through the degradation of the agricultural 
terms of trade. Conversely, when it is assumed that there is a perfect substitutability between 
domestic product and imports, the redistribution effects of the benefit of the shock of 
productivity (PGFAGRI-S5) are smaller and favorable, in this case, to the overall reduction of 
poverty and inequality because of the importance of poverty in the rural sector.  
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Table 23: Sensitivity Analysis of disaggregate results for simulation PGFAGRI 
  BASE  S0  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Income per capita             
     urban  1 628  1.9  2.0  1.8  2.0  3.2  1.3 
     rural  605  5.0  5.0  5.0  4.9  3.9  5.5 
     all  863  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.6  3.5 
Theil Index               
     urban  90.9  -0.8  -0.7  -0.9  -0.7  0.8  -1.5 
     rural  51.0  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.5 
     all  81.6  -1.5  -1.4  -1.6  -1.5  0.2  -2.6 
Theil within  70.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.9  -0.7  0.4  -1.7 
Theil between  11.6  -6.2  -6.0  -6.4  -5.9  -1.4  -8.5 
Poverty (P0)               
     urban  43.4  -2.6  -2.6  -2.6  -2.6  -3.4  -2.4 
     rural  74.9  -3.9  -3.8  -3.9  -3.8  -2.4  -4.9 
     all  67.0  -3.7  -3.6  -3.7  -3.6  -2.6  -4.5 
Gap (P1)               
     urban  17.6  -3.7  -3.6  -3.8  -3.6  -2.2  -4.5 
     rural  37.4  -4.6  -4.5  -4.7  -4.5  -2.9  -5.6 
     all  32.4  -4.5  -4.4  -4.6  -4.3  -2.8  -5.5 
Severity (P2)               
     urban  9.5  -3.8  -3.6  -4.0  -3.7  -1.2  -5.3 
     rural  23.3  -5.6  -5.5  -5.7  -5.4  -3.6  -6.9 
     all  19.8  -5.4  -5.3  -5.5  -5.2  -3.3  -6.8 
 
7. Impact of Social Programs on Poverty and Inequality 
Given the scope of the problems of poverty and inequality that Madagascar must face, 
the concepts of "safety net" or targeting of poor households can appear irrelevant. In an 
economic context where 67% of households live below the poverty line, it is difficult to  
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implement social programs to eradicate poverty, because the country simply does not have 
having financial means to do so. We show nevertheless the results of simulations of social 
programs, in order to inform the debate on the impact of these programs on poverty and 
inequality and to illustrate the potential contribution of the microsimulation model. The first 
simulation constitutes a reference since it analyzes a transfer which not only benefits all poor 
(perfect targeting) but which, in addition, transfers to each poor household an amount 
corresponding exactly to the difference between its income and the poverty line (perfect 
information on income). The following simulations present the impact of social programs 
targeted to households living below half, a quarter and an eighth of the poverty line. In the last 
two simulations, the programs are alternatively targeted on the urban poor households and the 
rural poor households living below a quarter of the poverty line.  
The results of the first four simulations (Table 24) highlight the problem of the 
implementation cost of such programs. The cost of a program represents the poverty gap which 
must be filled, i.e. the sum of the differences between income and poverty line for the 
households living below this threshold, that is to say 25.7% of the GDP of the base year for the 
program POOR1 which benefits all the poor households (by way of comparison, the public 
development aid received by Madagascar and the total foreign debt accounted for 12% and 
142% respectively of GNP in 1995). This figure makes it possible to measure the importance of 
the economic growth effort that would eradicate poverty, under the assumption that this growth 
is entirely redistributed to poor households and that there is no change in prices. In fact, this 
ideal program does not permit the complete eradication of poverty since the rate of poverty 
decreases by only 36.2%. This result is explained by the increase of prices of traditional goods 
which intervene in the calculation of real incomes: all the incomes are indeed deflated by a price 
index specific to each household, calculated starting from the idiosyncratic budgetary shares. 
Thus, for certain households, the transfer is "compensated" by the increase in prices. On the 
other hand, the depth and the severity of poverty are greatly reduced, by 98.7%, which is 
explained by the nature of the transfer. The latter being equal to the difference between income 
and poverty line, heterogeneity ex ante of the poor incomes of households is completely  
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eliminated. Ex post, certain households "cross back" below the poverty line because of the 
structure of their incomes and their consumption. One can expect that these households are net 
purchasers of traditional goods. 
 
Table 24: Impact of safety nets 
  BASE  POOR1  POOR2  POOR3  POOR4  PURB3  PRUR3 
% of PIB  25.7  18.3  7.5  2.4  0.6  6.9 
% of the population  66.8  33.1  11.2  3.3  0.9  10.3 
Income per capita             
     urban  1 628  3.0  1.7  0.4  0.2  1.1  -0.7 
     rural  605  44.1  32.6  14.1  4.6  0.2  14.0 
     all  863  24.5  17.9  7.6  2.5  0.6  7.0 
Theil Index               
     urban  90.9  -19.1  -12.8  -4.4  -1.6  -3.4  -1.1 
     rural  51.0  -54.2  -45.8  -24.8  -9.5  0.0  -24.8 
     all  81.6  -41.3  -32.8  -16.0  -5.8  -1.4  -14.8 
Poverty (P0)               
     urban  43.4  -29.8  -4.9  1.2  -0.2  0.0  1.4 
     rural  74.9  -37.5  -14.1  -2.1  -0.3  -0.1  -1.9 
     all  67.0  -36.2  -12.6  -1.6  -0.3  -0.1  -1.4 
Gap (P1)               
     urban  17.6  -98.0  -59.0  -18.1  -6.4  -17.2  -1.3 
     rural  37.4  -98.8  -72.0  -32.4  -10.7  -0.2  -32.4 
     all  32.4  -98.7  -70.2  -30.5  -10.1  -2.5  -28.1 
Severity (P2)               
     urban  9.5  -98.0  -76.0  -29.2  -11.0  -27.3  -2.2 
     rural  23.3  -98.8  -85.7  -44.3  -15.8  -0.3  -44.1 
     all  19.8  -98.7  -84.5  -42.5  -15.3  -3.5  -39.1 
 
The next three simulations show that less ambitious programs remain expensive. As an 
example, the program POOR4. which touches only the poorest 3.3%, costs 2.4% of GDP and 
allows only a 1.6%  reduction of the poverty rate. Its impact on the depth and the severity of  
  -55-
poverty appears obviously stronger (-30.5% and -42.5% respectively). These four programs 
contribute to the reduction of between and within-group inequality.  
The last two programs target only a subpopulation of poor households with incomes 
lower than a quarter of the poverty line. The targeting is no longer perfect since not all poor 
benefit from the program. On the other hand, information on incomes remains perfect and each 
targeted household receives a transfer equal to the difference between its income and the 
poverty line. The transfer program in the urban sector (PURB3) results in a small increase in the 
income of rural households thanks to an improvement in the agricultural terms of trade. 
Conversely, the transfer program in the rural sector (PRUR3) results in a degradation of the 
income of urban households. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The simulations results bear out the contribution of this approach to the analysis of the 
impact of various growth shocks on poverty and inequality. At the aggregate level, the market 
equilibrium equations allow endogenizing the determination of relative price, which makes it 
possible to take into account general equilibrium effects. The ex ante / ex post decomposition of 
results shows that the redistribution effect of the general equilibrium mechanisms can be 
significant. The decomposition of results by group illustrates the contribution of the 
microsimulation. This class of models allows computation of poverty and inequality indicators 
without resorting to the traditional assumptions on within-group distribution of the income. The 
comparison of two poverty indicators, one theoretical, the other one derived from the results of 
the model, and the decomposition of the evolution of an inequality indicator, show that these 
assumptions are likely to bias the results when analyzing the impact of positive or negative 
growth shocks. This bias is particularly significant if one is interested in the evolution of income, 
poverty and inequality for certain groups. On the other hand, the bias appears smaller when one 
is interested in the total indicators of poverty, but this result depends on the magnitude of the 
shocks. These results thus make it possible to define more precisely the "confidence interval" of 
the lognormal income distribution assumption. They do not give an answer on the validity of the  
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assumption of perfect aggregation. The variations of average income used to estimate the 
variations of the poverty rate built on the assumption of lognormal distribution, correspond truly 
to the average of the variations of the incomes of heterogeneous agents. There is no evidence 
that they correspond to the income variations of a representative agent subjected to the same 
shocks. To answer this question, it would be necessary to have a model with representative 
agents comparable to the disaggregated model.  
The analysis of the impact of various growth shocks on poverty and inequality also 
highlights the complexity of the mechanisms connecting macroeconomic shocks and income 
distribution, starting from a model that takes into account a great part of the diversity among 
households, but in addition considers only three sectors and four goods. The microeconomic 
specifications selected, although not standard, are nevertheless derived from a model of rational 
behavior, and the rationing schemes selected are relatively simple. Even so, the impact of a 
growth shock on each household is complex because it depends on the structural characteristics 
of each household as well as on the structural characteristics of the economy.  
Although the relative mean income and price changes are significant, the impact of the 
various growth shocks on the total indicators of poverty and inequality appears relatively small. 
This result is in conformity with the results of the studies on the evolution of inequality in time (Li, 
Squire and Zou, 1998). There are several explanations for this. First of all, the descriptive 
analysis of the household incomes shows how income sources are diversified. This 
diversification constitutes in itself a first protection strategy against risk insofar as the incomes 
coming from various sources are not directly correlated. In the second place, reallocation 
between various activities reinforces this strategy, while making it possible for households to 
react to significant price shocks. The existence of transaction costs weakens the size of these 
reactions. Finally, the inertia of total indicators is explained  by the unequal distribution of 
production factors. These inequalities will not disappear without proactive policies that give 
access to education and credit to poor households. This inertia nevertheless hides the 
importance of the phenomena of redistribution among household groups. Analyzing the results  
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through the filter of a classification into distinct socio-economic groups shows that the evolution 
of the poverty and inequality indicators can differ from one group to other.  
The results of sensitivity analyses highlight an important aspect in the questions of choice 
of development strategy. In order to be effective in reducing poverty and inequality, any 
development strategy based on the growth of the urban/formal sector has to be redistributed to 
agricultural/rural households through an improvement in the agricultural terms of trade. This 
transmission requires a strong integration of the urban and rural sectors. This integration can be 
carried out only at the price of investments in infrastructure, facilitating the circulation of goods 
between cities and the countryside. Conversely, any development strategy based on an increase 
in agricultural productivity must be careful not to ignore the problem of product outlets. The 
benefits of an increase in the productivity of the agricultural sector will be very largely 
redistributed to urban households through the drop in the price of the agricultural good, which 
can benefit the poor urban households, but a strong degradation of the agricultural terms of 
trade can have a negative impact on the welfare of the rural households.  
The scope of these results in the case of Madagascar is due to the extent of the 
problems of poverty and inequality that this "less advanced country" must face. In an economic 
context where more than two thirds of the households live below the poverty line, it appears 
indeed difficult to implement social programs to solve the problem of poverty. The results of the 
analyses of various "ideal" social programs (perfect targeting and perfect information on income) 
highlight this problem of cost as well as the importance of general equilibrium effects. 
Concerning the limits of the model, the extreme aggregation of goods and sectors does 
not allow to study the impact of more specific policies on poverty and income distribution. More 
precisely, the economic impact of certain macroeconomic policies or liberalization generally 
depends on the tradability of the goods produced by the economy. One of the contributions of 
the applied general equilibrium models is their capacity to take into account these structural 
effects through disaggregation of activities and goods. Several reasons explain why this capacity 
is lacking in the microsimulation model as it has been developed up to now. First of all, there 
remains a problem of data and estimation. Taking into account more goods requires one to be  
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able to connect the income of each household to each type of good represented. This operation 
is difficult given the quality of the available data. In addition, it is necessary to develop a labor 
allocation model with several goods, which considerably complicates the writing of the model. 
Lastly, it seemed to us interesting, initially, to develop a "simple" model to highlight the structural 
effects such as those described above.  Another possible extension of the model relates to the 
explicit modeling of macroeconomic closures. This extension requires a further integration of the 
model within a general equilibrium framework, adding government and savings-investment 
accounts. Finally, building a dynamic model constitutes another stage of development of the 
model. The introduction of the temporal dimension makes it possible to take into account 
demographic effects, which are fundamental to the evolution of inequality and poverty. The 
extensions described above can be envisaged as a "magic triangle" whose nodes would be i) the 
heterogeneity of the products, ii) the heterogeneity of the agents and iii) the temporal dimension. 
It is advisable to ponder between these three poles of disaggregation according to the problem 
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